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Abstract
In this article, we study the classical shortest queue problem under the influence of
malicious attacks, which is relevant to a variety of engineering system including trans-
portation, manufacturing, and communications. We consider a homogeneous Poisson
arrival process of jobs and two parallel exponential servers with symmetric service rates.
A system operator route incoming jobs to the shorter queue; if the queues are equal,
the job is routed randomly. A malicious attacker is able to intercept the operator’s
routing instruction and overwrite it with a randomly generated one. The operator is
able to defend individual jobs to ensure correct routing. Both attacking and defending
induce technological costs. The attacker’s (resp. operator’s) decision is the probability
of attacking (resp. defending) the routing of each job. We first quantify the queu-
ing cost for given strategy profiles by deriving a theoretical upper bound for the cost.
Then, we formulate a non-zero-sum attacker-defender game, characterize the equilibria
in multiple regimes, and quantify the security risk. We find that the attacker’s best
strategy is either to attack all jobs or not to attack, and the defender’s strategy is
strongly influenced by the arrival rate of jobs. Finally, as a benchmark, we compare
the security risks of the feedback-controlled system to a corresponding open-loop sys-
tem with Bernoulli routing. We show that the shorter-queue policy has a higher (resp.
lower) security risk than the Bernoulli policy if the demand is lower (resp. higher) than
the service rate of one server.
Keywords: Queuing systems, dynamic routing, attacker-defender game, security.
1 Introduction
The shorter-queue policy is a classical routing policy applicable to a variety of engineering
systems, including transportation [1], production lines [2], and communications [3]. The idea
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of this routing policy is that a job is allocated to a server with a shorter queue when it arrives,
which has been proved to be optimal if the system operator has perfect observation of the
system states and perfect implementation of the policy [4]. Such sensing and actuating typ-
ically rely on cyber components connected via wired or wireless communications. Although
such connectivity can significantly improve throughput and reduce delay, it is vulnerable to
malicious remote attacks and thus brings security risks. In intelligent transportation sys-
tems, researchers have shown that traffic sensors and traffic lights can be easily intruded and
manipulated [5, 6]. Similar security risks also exist in production lines [7] and communication
networks [8]. However, such risk has not been well modeled and studied in the setting of
queuing systems.
In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model for the two-queue system subject to
malicious attacks and estimate the security risk by characterizing the steady-state queue
lengths and the game equilibrium. We consider a homogeneous Poisson arrival process of
jobs and two parallel exponential servers with symmetric service rates. A system operator
route incoming jobs to the shorter queue; if the queues are equal, the job is routed randomly.
A malicious attacker is able to intercept the operator’s routing instruction and overwrite it
with a randomly generated one. The operator is able to defend individual jobs to ensure
correct routing. Both attack and defense induce technological costs. The attacker’s (resp.
operator’s) decision is the probability of attacking (resp. defending) the routing of each
customer. The attacker (resp. operator) is interested in maximizing (resp. minimizing)
the long-time-average network-wide queuing cost minus the attacking cost (resp. plus the
defending cost).
Numerous results have been developed for the two-queue system with perfect routing,
i.e. perfect sensing plus perfect actuating [9, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Although some of these
results provide hints for our problem, they do not directly apply to the security setting with
imperfect sensing and/or actuating. The two-queue system has been studied with delayed
[14], erroneous [15], or decentralized information [16], which provides insights for our purpose.
Based on previous results about the behavior of the generalized two-queue problem [12], we
show that the two-queue system is stable in the face of attacks if and only if the probability
of a successful attack, which is equal to the product of the probability of a job being attacked
and the probability of a job not being defended, is less than the ratio between the service
rate of one server and the jobs’ arrival rate. We further present an upper bound for the queue
length, which we use as an approximation for queuing cost.
Next, we characterize the Nash equilibrium of the attacker-defender game. Game theory is
a powerful tool for security risks analysis that has been extensively used in various engineering
systems [17, 18, 19]. Game theoretic approaches have been applied to studying security of
routing in transportation [20, 21] and communications [22, 23]. However, to the best of
our knowledge, the security risk of feedback routing policies has not been well studied from
a perspective combining game theory and queuing theory, which is essential for capturing
the interaction between the queuing dynamics and the players’ decisions. We quantitatively
characterize the security risk (in terms of additional queuing cost and technological cost for
defense) in various scenarios. We show that the game has multiple regimes for equilibria
dependent on the technological costs of attacking and of defending as well as the demand.
A key finding is that the attacker would either attack no jobs or attack all jobs. When the
attacking cost is high, the attacker may have no incentive to attack any jobs; consequently,
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the defender does not need to defend any jobs. When the attacking cost is low, the attacker
will attack every job; in this case, the defender’s behavior will depend on the defending cost.
The regimes also depend on the arrival rate of jobs: for higher arrival rates, the attacker has a
higher incentive to attack, and the defender has a higher incentive to defend. In particular, if
the arrival rate is less than the service rate of one server and the defense cost is prohibitively
high, then the defender may has zero incentive to defend any jobs, regardless of the attacker’s
action.
As a benchmark for the closed-loop shorter-queue routing policy, we also consider an
open-loop Bernoulli routing policy. The Bernoulli policy allocates each arriving job to either
server with equal probabilities. In this case, the attacker can still intercept the routing
instruction and replace it with a falsified one, and the attacker can protect a job from being
attacked. It is well known that the shorter-queue policy is in general more efficient than the
Bernoulli policy in the nominal setting with perfect sensing and actuating. In the presence
of security failures, we show the shorter-queue policy has a higher (resp. lower) security risk
than the Bernoulli policy if the demand is lower (resp. higher) than the service rate of one
server.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we develop a formulation for security
risk analysis of the two-queue system by synthesizing a queuing model and a game-theoretic
model. Second, we quantify the relation between the queuing cost and the actions for the
attacker and the defender as well as key parameters of the model. Third, we characterize the
equilibria of the attacker-defender game and derive practical insights for dynamic routing.
Finally, we compare the security risks of the closed-loop shorter queue policy with the open-
loop Bernoulli policy. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce the two-queue model and derive the queuing cost. In Section 3, we formulate the
attacker-defender game and characterize the structure of the equilibria in various regimes.
In Section 4, we compare the shorter-queue routing policy with the Bernoulli routing policy
in terms of both nominal efficiency and security risk.
2 Parallel queuing system facing attacks
Consider the parallel queuing system in Fig. 1. Jobs arrive according to a Poisson process of
rate λ. Each server serves jobs at an exponential rate of µ. We use X(t) and Y (t) to denote
the number of jobs, including waiting and being served, in the two servers, respectively. The
state space of the parallel queuing system is Z2≥0.
Figure 1: Two-queue system with shorter-queue routing and malicious attacks.
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In the absence of attacks, the system operator has perfect observation of the states X(t)
and Y (t). When a job arrives at time t, the operator allocates it to the shorter queue. That is,
the job is allocated to server 1 (resp. 2) if X(t) < Y (t) (resp. X(t) > Y (t)); if X(t) = Y (t),
then the job is allocated to each server with probability 1/2.
A malicious attacker is able to compromise the operator’s dynamic routing. When a
job arrives and is being allocated, the attacker is able to intercept the operator’s routing
instruction and replace it with a random one. Consequently, the job may be mistakenly
allocated to the longer queue. Attacks have no impact when the queues are equal. Each
job is attacked with probability a ∈ [0, 1], where a is selected by the attacker. When a
job’s routing is attacked, the original routing instruction is overwritten; instead, the job is
routed to server 1 with probability p and to server 2 with probability 1− p, where p ∈ [0, 1]
is selected by the attacker. The system operator is able to protect a job’s routing. When
a job is protected, its routing is guaranteed to be correct, i.e. going to the shorter queue.
The probability that a job is protected is d ∈ [0, 1], which is selected by the operator. If
the attacker does not attack or if the defender defends, which happens with probability
(1−a(1−d)) a job goes to the good node (“G” in Fig. 1) and is routed by the shorter-queue
policy. Otherwise, the job goes to the bad node (“B” in Fig. 1) and is routed randomly.
In the rest of this section, we first discuss the stability of the queues in the face of malicious
attacks. Then, we provide a theoretical upper bound for the queue length, which we will use
as an approximation of queuing cost.
2.1 Stability
It is well known that, in the absence of malicious attacks, the two-queue system is stable if
and only if the demand is less than the total capacity, i.e. λ < 2µ. In the result below, we
show that malicious attacks can destabilize the queuing system.
Proposition 1 The parallel queuing system is stable (i.e. positive recurrent) if and only if
λ < 2µ, (1a)
a(1− d)pλ < µ, (1b)
a(1− d)(1− p)λ < µ. (1c)
Proof. The queuing system is equivalent to a two-queue system with three classes of jobs.
The first class enters server 1 as a Poisson process of rate a(1−d)pλ. The second class enters
server 2 as a Poisson process of rate a(1−d)(1−p)λ. The third class arrive at the two-queue
system as a Poisson process of rate (1− a(1 − d))λ; when a job of this class arrives, the job
joins the shorter queue. Thus, by [12, Theorem 1], the three-class, two-queue system is stable
if and only if
max{a(1− d)(1− p)λ/µ, (1− a(1− d))λ/µ, λ/(2µ)} < 1,
which is equivalent to (1a)–(1c). 
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Proposition 1 indicates the two-queue system with shorter-queue routing is stable regard-
less of attack and defence given λ < µ. But when λ ≥ µ, the system stability is associated
with a, d and p. For example, Fig. 2 illustrates the stability regime in the a-d plane given
λ = 0.6, µ = 0.5, p = 1. It illustrates defending probability d should not be too low when
attacking probability is high; otherwise, the system is unstable.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
a
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
d Stable
Unstable
Figure 2: Stability of shorter-queue system for various attacking probability a and
defending probability d.
2.2 Computing queuing cost
Analytical solution to the shorter-queue problem is very hard and unnecessarily complex for
our purpose. Instead, we derive a simple theoretical upper bound as an approximation. The
derivation is based on [12].
Proposition 2 The mean number of jobs N¯ = X¯ + Y¯ in the system is upper bounded by
N¯ ≤ n¯(a, p, d;λ)
:= −2 + 2µ
min{µ− a˜pλ, µ− a˜(1− p)λ, µ− λ/2} (2)
where a˜ = a(1− d).
3 Security game
Consider the two-queue system with the shorter-queue routing policy and under the attack
of the attacker and defense of the operator (defender). Throughout this paper, we assume
that the system is nominally stable, i.e.
λ < 2µ.
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An attack induces a technological cost of ca ≥ 0 on the attacker. The attacker’s utility is
the difference of the (upper bound of) average total queue size and the average technological
cost:
ua(a, p, d;λ) = n¯(a, p, d;λ)− λcaa.
As for the operator, protecting a job induces a technological cost of cd ≥ 0. The operator
aims at shorter queue length and lower cost, and thus the utility is given by
ud(a, p, d;λ) = −n¯(a, p, d;λ)− λcdd.
An important observation from (2) is that the best response of the attacker must be such
that either p = 0 or p = 1. That is, when the attacker modifies the routing instruction, the
attacker always allocate jobs to the same server. This is intuitive in that sending all jobs to
one server will cause higher delay than distributing jobs over two servers. Hence, p can be
actually dropped from the utility function, and we will let p = 1 henceforth. With a slight
abuse of notation, we write
ua(a, d;λ) =
{
−2+ 2µ
min{µ−a˜λ,µ−λ/2}
− λcaa a˜ < µλ
+∞ a˜ ≥ µ
λ
and
ud(a, d;λ) =
{
2− 2µ
min{µ−a˜λ,µ−λ/2}
− λcdd a˜ < µλ
−∞ a˜ ≥ µ
λ
where a˜ = a(1− d).
We define security risk Rss(a, d;λ) for two-queue system with shorter-queue routing as
follows
Rss(a, d;λ) := ud(0, 0;λ)− ud(a, d;λ).
Fig. 3 illustrates Rss(a, d;λ) in two numerical examples with different λ, given µ = 0.5 and
cd = 20. Fig. 3a shows that R
s
s(a, d;λ) mainly rises with d, which means that defense cost cd
dominates in security risk when λ = 0.4 and µ = 0.6. In this case, it is expected that defense
might be forsaken if defense cost becomes too high. In addition, Fig. 3b shows the stronger
relationship between Rss(a, d;λ) and attack probability a when λ = 0.6 and µ = 0.5. Under
the fierce attack, Rss(a, d;λ) increases dramatically, and the operator must take defense action
to minimize the security risk; otherwise, the system would get into the unstable state that is
denoted by the empty under red line in Fig. 3b.
We use (a∗, d∗) to denote the equilibria in the above security game, then we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 The attacker-defender game has the following regimes of equilibria:
(A) Regime A: a∗ = 0, d∗ = 0;
(B) Regime B: a∗ = 1. According to the value of d∗, this regime can be further partitioned
into two subregimes:
(B1) a
∗ = 1, d∗ = 0;
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Figure 3: Security risk under shorter-queue routing
(B2) a
∗ = 1, d∗ = 1− 1
λ
(µ−√2µ/cd).
Furthermore, regime B1 is non-empty if and only if λ < µ.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1 and the characterization
and visualization of the regime boundaries.
3.1 Properties of equilibria
Any equilibrium (a∗, d∗) satisfies
a∗ = arg max
a∈[0,1]
n¯(a, d∗;λ)− λcaa,
d∗ = arg max
d∈[0,1]
−n¯(a∗, d;λ)− λcdd.
The following results characterize important qualitative properties of the equilibria, which
are the basis for our subsequent analysis.
Proposition 3 For any equilibrium (a∗, d∗), either a∗ = 0 or a∗ = 1.
Proof. Given d = d∗, the attacker’s utility is given by
ua(a, d
∗;λ) = −2 + 2µ
min{µ− a(1− d∗)λ, µ− λ/2} − λcaa.
We need to consider two cases. In the first case that µ− a(1− d∗)λ > µ− λ/2, we have
ua(a, d
∗;λ) = −2 + 2µ
µ− λ/2 − λcaa,
which immediately imply that a∗ = argmaxa∈[0,1] f(a) = 0. In the second case that µ−a(1−
d∗)λ < µ − λ/2, note that the stability condition µ − a(1 − d∗λ) > 0 must hold; otherwise
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the defender must be able to improve the utility by increasing d. Thus, we have
ua(a, d
∗;λ) = −2 + 2µ
µ− a(1− d∗)λ − λcaa,
∂2
∂a2
ua(a, d
∗;λ) =
2λ(1− d∗)
[µ− a(1− d∗)λ]3
which implies that ua(a, d
∗;λ) is convex in a for any d∗; therefore a∗ = 0 or a∗ = 1. 
Proposition 4 For any equilibrium (a∗, d∗) such that a∗ = 0, we have d∗ = 0.
Proof. If a∗ = 0, we have
d∗ = arg max
d∈[0,1]
−2 + 2µ
µ− λ/2 + λcdd,
which immediately implies that d∗ = 0. 
3.2 Regime boundaries
Since, by Proposition 3, each equilibrium (a∗, d∗) satisfies either a∗ = 0 or a∗ = 1, we only
need to consider the utilities for a = 0 and a = 1. By Proposition 4, the best response for
the defender when a = 0 is d∗(0) = 0. For a = 0 and d = 0, we have
ua(0, 0;λ) = −2 + 2µ
µ− λ/2 ,
ud(0, 0;λ) = 2− 2µ
µ− λ/2 .
For a = 1, we have
ua(1, d;λ)=
{
−2+ 2µ
min{µ−(1−d)λ,µ−λ/2}
−λca 1− d < µλ
+∞ 1− d ≥ µ
λ
,
ud(1, d;λ)=
{
2− 2µ
min{µ−(1−d)λ,µ−λ/2}
−λcdd 1− d < µλ
−∞ 1− d ≥ µ
λ
.
For ease of presentation, define
γ :=
1
λ
√
µ(
√
µ−
√
2/cd). (3)
Given a = 1, the best response for the defender is given by
d∗(1) =


0 if γ ≥ 1
1− γ if 1/2 < γ < 1
1
2
if γ ≤ 1/2.
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and the utility associated with the above best response is given by
ua(1, d
∗(1);λ) =


−2 + 2µ
µ−λ
− λca if γ ≥ 1
−2 + 2µ
µ−γλ
− λca if 1/2 < γ < 1
−2 + 2µ
µ−λ/2
− λca if γ ≤ 1/2.
For γ ≤ 1/2, we have ua(0, d∗(0);λ) > ua(1, d∗(1);λ). Therefore, the equilibrium is (0, 0).
For 1/2 < γ < 1, if
−2 + 2µ
µ− λ/2 > −2 +
2µ
µ− γλ − λca,
the equilibrium is (0, 0), and if
−2 + 2µ
µ− λ/2 < −2 +
2µ
µ− γλ − λca,
the equilibrium is (1, 1− γ).
For γ ≥ 1, if
−2 + 2µ
µ− λ/2 > −2 +
2µ
µ− λ − λca,
the equilibrium is (0, 0), and if
−2 + 2µ
µ− λ/2 < −2 +
2µ
µ− λ − λca,
the equilibrium is (1, 0).
In summary, the regimes are
(A) a∗ = 0, d∗ = 0 if (i) 1/2 < γ < 1 and 2µ
µ−λ/2
> 2µ
µ−γλ
− λca, or if (ii) γ ≥ 1 and
2µ
µ−λ/2
> 2µ
µ−λ
− λca, or if (iii) γ < 1/2;
(B) a∗ = 1 with two subregimes:
(B1) a
∗ = 1, d∗ = 0 if 2µ
µ−λ/2
< 2µ
µ−λ
− λca and γ ≥ 1;
(B2) a
∗ = 1, d∗ = 1− 1
λ
(µ−√2µ/cd) if 2µµ−λ/2 < 2µµ−γλ − λca and 1/2 < γ < 1.
Fig. 4 illustrates the regimes in two numerical cases with different λ, given µ = 0.5. Each
regime is labeled with the corresponding (a∗, d∗). (0, 0) indicates that there is no attack and
therefore no defense is needed. This regime is associated with high attack cost ca and low
defense cost cd. Given large ca, the attack has no incentive and given small cd, the attack
must be counteracted by the defender. When cd increases, the defender’s strategy will be
increasingly influenced by the technological cost, which leaves opportunities for the attacker.
This regime is denoted by (1, dˆ). Importantly, the defender’s action strongly depend on
whether λ is less than µ. As shown in Fig. 4a, the attacker has no incentive to defend when
λ < µ. But given λ ≥ µ, the defense would continue since the outcome of instability is much
severer. As a result, (1, 0) is removed in Fig. 4b.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium regime under Shorter routing
4 Comparison with open-loop routing
To evaluate the system performance under shorter-queue routing, we compare it with that
under Bernoulli routing. Bernoulli routing herein means that the router assigns jobs to each
server with probability 1/2; see Fig. 5. We first point out the queuing cost for Bernoulli
routing, then compare the security risk and equilibrium regime with those of shorter-queue
routing.
Figure 5: Two-queue system with Bernoulli routing and malicious attacks.
4.1 Queuing cost for Bernoulli routing
The job arriving at server 1 can be divided into two classes. The first is attacked, while the
second is not attacked. The arrival rates are pa(1 − d)λ and (1− a(1− d))λ/2 respectively.
Thus the arrival rate at server 1 equals (1−a(1−d)
2
+pa(1−d))λ. Recall that we use a˜ to denote
a(1− d). Then the arrival rate at server 1 is simplified as 1−a˜+2pa˜
2
λ, and, by standard results
in queuing theory [24, p.326] we have the mean number of jobs at server 1
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X¯ =
(1− a˜+ 2pa˜)λ
2µ− (1− a˜+ 2pa˜)λ.
The mean number of jobs at server 2 is computed similarly, and we have the total job
number:
X¯ + Y¯ =
(1− a˜+ 2pa˜)λ
2µ− (1− a˜ + 2pa˜)λ +
(1 + a˜− 2pa˜)λ
2µ− (1 + a˜− 2pa˜)λ.
4.2 Security game for Bernoulli routing
Similar to the attack on shorter-queue routing, the best attack strategy must be either p = 1
or p = 0. We let p = 1, then the attacker’s utility under Bernoulli routing is
va(a, d;λ) =
{
(1+a˜)λ
2µ−(1+a˜)λ
+ (1−a˜)λ
2µ−(1−a˜)λ
− caλa 1 + a˜ < 2µλ
+∞ 1 + a˜ ≥ 2µ
λ
,
and the defender’s utility is
vd(a, d;λ) =
{
−(1+a˜)λ
2µ−(1+a˜)λ
− (1−a˜)λ
2µ−(1−a˜)λ
− cdλd 1 + a˜ < 2µλ
−∞ 1 + a˜ ≥ 2µ
λ
.
We define security risk Rbs(a, d;λ) for two-queue system with Bernoulli routing as follows
Rbs(a, d;λ) := vd(0, 0;λ)− vd(a, d;λ).
Fig. 6 illustrates Rbs(a, d;λ) in two numerical examples with different λ, given µ = 0.5
and cd = 20. The revealed relationship between security risk and a, d in Bernoulli routing
is similar to that in shorter-queue routing. However, in terms of security risk, Fig. 3a and
Fig. 6a show Bernoulli routing slightly superior to shorter-queue routing, while Fig. 3b and
Fig. 6b show shorter-queue routing is much better than Bernoulli routing. Combining Fig. 3a
and Fig. 6a, we find Rbs(a, d;λ) is lower than R
s
s(a, d;λ) when (a, d) is around (1, 0) given
λ = 0.4. On the contrary, Fig. 3b and Fig. 6b show security risks of Bernoulli routing is
obviously higher that those of shorter-queue routing when a > 0.5, given λ = 0.6.
The contradictory observations from Fig. 3 and Fig. 6 is caused by the approximation
error of queue cost in shorter-queue routing. Recall that we use a up bound to represent the
queue cost for shorter-queue routing, and the above findings indicate the upper bound might
overestimate the queue length when λ < µ and then mislead the strategy in equilibrium,
which is demonstrated later.
We use (a†, d†) to denote the equilibrium in the security game for Bernoulli routing. The
regimes are summarized as follows and more details are available in the appendix.
(A) a† = 0, d† = 0 if (i) λ < µ, (2µ−λ)λ
2(µ−λ)µ
≤ cd and 2λ2µ−λ ≥ λµ−λ−caλ, or if (ii) λ < µ, (2µ−λ)λ2(µ−λ)µ >
cd and
2λ
2µ−λ
≥ (2−dˆ)
2µ−(2−dˆ)λ
+ dˆλ
2µ−dˆλ
−caλ, or if (iii) λ ≥ µ and 2λ2µ−λ ≥ (2−dˆ)λ2µ−(2−dˆ)λ+ dˆλ2µ−dˆλ−caλ;
(B) a† = 1 with two subregimes:
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Figure 6: Security risk under Bernoulli routing
(B1) a
† = 1, d† = 0 if λ < µ, (2µ−λ)λ
2(µ−λ)µ
≤ cd and 2λ2µ−λ < λµ−λ − caλ
(B2) a
† = 1, d† = dˆ if (i) λ < µ, (2µ−λ)λ
2(µ−λ)µ
> cd and
2λ
2µ−λ
< (2−dˆ)
2µ−(2−dˆ)λ
+ dˆλ
2µ−dˆλ
− caλ, or if
(ii) λ ≥ µ and 2λ
2µ−λ
< (2−dˆ)λ
2µ−(2−dˆ)λ
+ dˆλ
2µ−dˆλ
− caλ.
where dˆ = 1 − 1
λ
(θ −
√
ζ2 − θ2 + 2κζ
θ
), ζ = 2µ − λ, κ = µ/cd, θ =
√
η + ζ
4
9η
+ ζ
2
3
, η =
3
√
ζ6
27
+
κ2ζ2
2
+
√
κ2ζ8
27
+
κ4ζ4
4
.
Fig. 7 illustrates the regimes in two numerical examples with different λ, given µ = 0.5.
Each regime is labeled with the corresponding (a†, d†). Compared with Fig. 4a, Fig. 7a shows
that (1, 0) can be achieved with lower cd given ca and (0, 0) can be also realized with lower
ca given cd. The reason is that the queue cost of shorter-queue routing is overestimated by
the upper bound and thus the attacker/defender is willing to undertake more attack/defense
costs. In case of λ = 0.6, Fig. 7b illustrates that (0, 0) is achieved with larger ca given cd.
This means Bernoulli routing is less effective than shorter-queue routing since it requires
larger ca to prevent attack.
We further compare security risks in a state of equilibrium under the two routing policies.
By fixing µ = 0.5 and ca = 1, we choose (λ, cd) = (0.4, 20), (0.4, 110), (0.6, 110) to study
three kinds of equilibrium respectively, namely (1, dˆ) given λ < µ, (1, 0) given λ < µ and
(1, dˆ) givenλ ≥ µ. The comparison is presented in Fig. 8, where Rq and Rs respectively
denote queue risk and security risk through theoretical analysis, while R˜q and R˜s denote
the values through numerical simulation. Herein we define queue risk Rq as queue length
under attack and defense minus that free from attack. Then the blank area in the bars of
Fig. 8 can be recognized as defense costs. Fig. 8a shows the defense cost of shorter-queue
routing in equilibrium given λ = 0.4, µ = 0.5, ca = 1, cd = 20 is much more than that of
Bernoulli routing. The reason might lie in that the queue length overestimated by the upper
bound induces the defender to adopt larger dˆ, which finally results in more security risk.
Fig. 8b explicitly presents the relative approximation error might be large when λ < µ.
Fig. 8c illustrates the huge advantage of shorter-queue routing when λ ≥ µ. The numerical
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Figure 7: Equilibrium regime under Bernoulli routing
simulation shows that the security risk is decreased by 37%.
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Figure 8: Comparison of security risk
5 Concluding remarks
This work quantifies the security risks of two-queue system that is routed by shortest-queue
policy and suffers malicious attack. Our theoretical analysis can help decision-makers figure
out appropriate strategies against attack. The comparison with Bernoulli routing demon-
strates that the proposed methodology has great potentials, especially when the system is
congested, but it also indicates the requirement for more powerful tools that accurately ap-
proximates queue cost in two-queue system.
This work can serve as the basis for multiple future research directions. First, the impact
of more sophisticated attacking strategies such as state-dependent attacking probability can
be studied in our framework. Second, the effect of fault-tolerant routing algorithms can be
analyzed in terms of reducing security risks. Third, multi-stage attacker-defender game with
13
strategy learning (e.g. the formulation in [25]) may provide additional insights about secure
design.
Appendix
5.1 Equilibrium regime under Bernoulli routing
Like equilibria (a∗, d∗) in shorter-queue routing, equilibria (a†, d†) have the properties that
a† equals either 0 or 1 and d† must equal 0 given a† = 0. For a = 0 and d = 0, we have
va(0, 0;λ) =
2λ
2µ− λ,
vd(0, 0;λ) = − 2λ
2µ− λ.
For a = 1, the attacker’s utility is given by
va(1, d;λ) =
{
(2−d)λ
2µ−(2−d)λ
+ dλ
2µ−dλ
− caλ 2− d < 2µλ
+∞ 2− d ≥ 2µ
λ
,
and the defender’s utility is given by
vd(1, d;λ) =
{
−(2−d)λ
2µ−(2−d)λ
− dλ
2µ−dλ
− cdλd 2− d < 2µλ
−∞ 2− d ≥ 2µ
λ
.
Given a = 1, we have the following best response
d∗(1) =
{
0 if λ < µ and (2µ−λ)λ
2(µ−λ)µ
− cd > 0
dˆ if i) λ < µ and (2µ−λ)λ
2(µ−λ)µ
− cd ≤ 0 or ii) λ ≥ µ
where (2µ−λ)λ
2(µ−λ)µ
− cd denotes ∂vd(1,d;λ)∂d |d=0 and dˆ satisfies ∂vd(1,d;λ)∂d |d=dˆ = 0.
By solving ∂vd(1,d;λ)
∂d
= 0, we have
dˆ = 1− 1
λ
(θ −
√
ζ2 − θ2 + 2κζ
θ
)
where ζ = 2µ− λ, κ = µ/cd, θ =
√
η + ζ
4
9η
+ ζ
2
3
, η =
3
√
ζ6
27
+
κ2ζ2
2
+
√
κ2ζ8
27
+
κ4ζ4
4
.
The attacker’s best utility is given by
ua(1, d
∗(1);λ)
=


λ
µ−λ
− λca if λ < µ and (2µ−λ)λ2(µ−λ)µ > cd
(2−dˆ)λ
µ−(2−dˆ)λ
+ dˆλ
µ−dˆλ
− λca if i)λ < µ and (2µ−λ)λ2(µ−λ)µ ≤ cd
or ii)λ ≥ µ.
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For λ < µ and (2µ−λ)λ
2(µ−λ)µ
> cd, if
2λ
2µ− λ >
λ
µ− λ − λca,
the equilibrium is (0, 0), and if
2λ
2µ− λ <
λ
µ− λ − λca,
the equilibrium is (1, 0).
For λ < µ and (2µ−λ)λ
2(µ−λ)µ
≤ cd, if
2λ
2µ− λ >
(2− d)λ
2µ− (2− d)λ +
dλ
2µ− dλ − λca,
the equilibrium is (0, 0), and if
2λ
2µ− λ <
(2− d)λ
2µ− (2− d)λ +
dλ
2µ− dλ − λca,
the equilibrium is (1, dˆ).
Finally for λ ≥ µ, if
2λ
2µ− λ >
(2− d)λ
2µ− (2− d)λ +
dλ
2µ− dλ − λca,
the equilibrium is (0, 0), and if
2λ
2µ− λ <
(2− d)λ
2µ− (2− d)λ +
dλ
2µ− dλ − λca,
the equilibrium is (1, dˆ).
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